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INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Vermax of Florida, Inc. ("Vermax of Florida"), pursuant to Rule 24(c)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, respectfully submits its Reply Brief in response
to the Brief of Respondent Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commission"). Now that
the Tax Commission has identified the allegedly taxable transactions as in-state sales of
component parts that Vermax of Florida incorporates into products for resale, this Court
should reverse and remand the Tax Commission's determination that Vermax of Florida
is liable for those taxes. Such sales are exempt, and the Tax Commission's effort to tax
those component sales by claiming that Vermax of Florida owned those components at
the time they were ultimately made a part of real property outside of this State is neither
based on fact nor supported by the record.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Because the Tax Commission incorrectly characterized certain portions of the
record, Vermax of Florida must reply here by setting forth those portions of the record
that have been misinterpreted. The most apparent misinterpretation is evident where the
Tax Commission states that Vermax of Florida "argued" that its "'furnish and install'"
contracts were statutorily exempt. (Tax Commission Brief, at 5). In fact, Vermax of
Florida did not and does not enter into "furnish and install" contracts and accordingly
never made such an argument. Such a characterization is a legal conclusion ultimately
to be determined by this Court. Instead, Vermax of Florida entered into sales contracts
1

by which it sold its products to out-of-state purchasers. In certain infrequent instances
at issue here, Vermax of Florida was also asked to provide a bid for the installation of
the products already sold or to be sold to the out-of-state customer. At the time that
those products were installed by Vermax of Florida's local subcontractors, they were not
owned by Vermax of Florida. The sale was complete, and those products could have
been installed by entities based in Nova Scotia or Tierra del Fuego, all without tax
consequences to Vermax of Florida. The separate sale and installation of the products
at issue are factually and legally distinguishable from "furnish and install" contracts, by
which a seller agrees in one contract to sell and install a product, with title to pass only
after the installation is completed. That did not occur here, and thus this Court should
reverse and remand.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Vermax of Florida incorporates its Statement of Facts set forth in its Brief and
responds to the Tax Commission's Statement of Facts as follows.
Section A of Tax Commission's Statement of Facts
The Tax Commission asserts that "[i]n 1986, Vermax was previously assessed for
failure to collect tax on 'furnish and install' contracts." (Tax Commission Brief, at 6).
This statement is inaccurate in two respects. First, as set forth in Vermax of Florida's
Brief (the "Brief"), the entity assessed in 1986 was Vermax Corporation, a Utah
corporation that was completely separate and distinct from Vermax of Florida, a Florida
2

corporation that merely purchased certain assets from Vermax Corporation. Pursuant to
a Stipulation to Amend Record, this Court should note that the subject of the previous
audit, Vermax Corporation, changed its name on August 31, 1987 to G. Hawke
Manufacturing Co., Inc., which continued in existence until it was involuntarily dissolved
on May 1, 1992. It is also a fact that Vermax of Florida, Inc., the Petitioner here, is a
Florida corporation that, prior to 1987, was called Trespo, Inc. As will be described in
greater detail below, the distinction between the two entities is far more significant than
a mere difference in name. By failing to acknowledge that a distinct corporation with
different owners was assessed in 1986, the Tax Commission's Statement of Facts gives
the incorrect impression that Vermax of Florida has blatantly ignored prior tax decisions
and treatments directed at it. There were none.
Second, the statement once again erroneously characterizes the transactions at issue
as "furnish and install" contracts. That error is repeated throughout the Statement of
Facts and throughout the argument portion of the Tax Commission's Brief. As explained
at pages 23-25 of Vermax of Florida's Brief, that erroneous characterization also
contradicts the express stipulation of the parties, which fact stipulations the Tax
Commission ignored or overlooked when it rendered its decision. (R.0021-23, attached
to the Brief as A.8).
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Section B of Tax Commission's Statement of Facts
With respect to the installation of products purchased by out-of-state customers,
the Tax Commission labeled installation "a component part of the agreement," citing page
44 of the Formal Hearing Transcript. (Tax Commission Brief, at 9). Page 44 of that
transcript does not contain such testimony, nor does any other portion of the transcript.
There was more than one agreement. Installation was a component part of the installation
agreements entered into by Vermax of Florida, which agreements contemplate only the
installation of goods, the title to which had already passed to out-of-state purchasers.
(See A.8 of Brief). With or without installation, Vermax sold its products to out-of-state
purchasers, and the only "component" of those agreements was the sale in interstate
commerce. Installation was a separate matter, covered by a separate agreement that could
have been cancelled, terminated, breached, or otherwise avoided with no effect
whatsoever on the separate sale agreement.
Section C of Tax Commission's Statement of Facts
The numerous problems with the Tax Commission's recitation of the history
underlying the negligence penalty are set forth in the Argument section of this Reply
Brief.
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Section D of Tax Commission's Statement of Facts
The Tax Commission repeats its incorrect description of the separate and legally
distinct purchase and installation agreements as "components" instead of two separate and
distinct contracts, as indicated in the stipulation filed with the Tax Commission. (See A.8
of Brief; R. 0021-23).
SUMMARY OF VERMAX OF FLORIDA'S TRANSACTIONS
The following table, Figure 1, demonstrates that Vermax of Florida sells its
products in one of two ways: in-state and out-of-state. The first type of sale involves
wholesale, in-state purchases of components which are tax exempt, because the
components go into products manufactured for resale, followed by sales of the final
product that take place in Utah. A sales tax is applied to those retail sales of final
products here in Utah, and those sales are not at issue here. The second type of sale
involves the same tax exempt, in-state purchases of components, followed by final
product sales that take place in interstate commerce, and are thus exempt from sales tax.
The Tax Commission has invented a third type of transaction from the out-of-state sales,
one in which Vermax of Florida has also agreed, via separate bid and contract, to be
responsible for the installation of the products it has already sold to out-of-state
customers.

The mere fact that Vermax of Florida, as opposed to anyone else, is

responsible for installing the products that are already owned by the out-of-state customer
does not translate into a tax liability that relates all the way back to the in-state
5

component sales, which everyone agrees are exempt absent Vermax of Florida's contracts
to install the products it has already sold in interstate commerce.

FIGURE 1
Purchase
Manufacture
Raw Materials — > Products
(exempt)
§ 59-12-103(l)(a)
Rule R865-19-29S

Out-of-State (exempt) § 59-12-104(12)
->
Sales: title
Rule 865-19-44S(B)
passes to buyer ~ > third party installs Vermax arranges
-or- > buyer arranges for third
party to install or otherwise
dispose of product
-orIn-State Sales
(taxable)

ARGUMENT
Now that the Tax Commission has clarified which transaction it wishes to tax, the
resolution of this case will depend on the resolution of one simple legal fact: Who owned
the Vermax of Florida products at the time they were installed in facilities owned by outof-state purchasers of Vermax products. The Tax Commission has sought to characterize
the transactions at issue as "furnish and install" contracts. By definition, "furnish and
install" contracts involve products that are not owned by the out-of-state customers until
they are installed into real property and have become fixtures therein. The "furnish and
install" characterization is legally flawed here, and runs counter to the facts in the record,
including facts to which the Tax Commission stipulated and completely ignored when it
6

made its Findings. Because Vermax of Florida sold and sells its products to out-of-state
customers without any requirement or other condition tying those sales to a subsequent
installation contract, this Court should treat those transactions accordingly, and not
penalize Vermax of Florida with component sales taxes merely because it helps its
customers install products that it no longer owns.
I.

BECAUSE VERMAX OF FLORIDA DOES NOT OWN THE PRODUCTS IT
HAS SOLD TO OUT-OF-STATE CUSTOMERS AT THE TIME THEY ARE
INSTALLED INTO REAL PROPERTY. IT HAS NO SALES TAX
LIABILITY,
In all of Vermax of Florida's sales to out-of-state customers, the out-of-state

purchaser takes title to the products at the time of delivery in the other state. Regardless
of what happens after that point, Vermax of Florida no longer owns, controls, or is
responsible for that personal property.

Even where Vermax of Florida arranges

installation, and even if this Court concludes that Vermax of Florida is the installer, the
fact remains that Vermax of Florida does not arrange or effect the installation of any
products that it still owns.
Because Vermax of Florida does not own the property when it is installed, Vermax
of Florida is in the identical position to that of the contractor in Thorup Brothers
Construction v. Auditing Division, 860 P.2d 324 (Utah 1993). The Utah Supreme Court
in Thorup articulated the rule that if a contractor does not own the personal property it
is converting into real property, there is no sales tax consequence to the installer or to the
7

manufacturer/seller of the products (provided the purchaser is a tax exempt entity). IcL
at 328-39. The Thorup contractor was not liable for tax on items installed into real
property because it, like Vermax of Florida, did not own the property it installed and thus
could not be the ultimate consumer of tangible personal property converted into real
property. IcL Because of the interstate nature of the sales at issue here, Vermax's outof-state customers are tax exempt entities, just as the Thorup contractor's school was a
tax exempt entity. Thus, this Court should reverse and remand.
As the facts of this case are analogous to Thorup, they are unlike the facts in
Tummurru Trades v. Utah State Tax Commission, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990), relied upon
by the Tax Commission.

In Tummurru, the company bought raw materials,

manufactured its products in one arm of the company, and sold the products to another
arm of the company that installed the products. The taxable event in Tummurru was the
intra-state sale of those final products between arms of the company before they were
shipped out of state for installation. And at all times, Tummurru owned the products
right up to the point they became fixtures in real property. As such Tummurru was
responsible for converting personal property it owned into real property. Tummurru is
not concerned with the purchase of raw materials (the allegedly taxable event here), but
with an in-state sale of final products occurring between two arms of the same company.
Simply stated, Tummurru does not speak to tax liability on the initial purchase of raw
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materials, and the fact that it involves an intermediate sale to itself and a subsequent
installation of property it owns makes it inapposite to this case.
Here, in contrast to Tummurru, Vermax of Florida bought the raw materials,
manufactured the products from those materials for resale, and sold the products in the
form of tangible personal property to third parties -- the out-of-state purchasers. There
was no intra-state transaction, except for the purchase of raw materials that the Tax
Commission is trying to tax here. But raw material purchases like those here are exempt
as wholesale transactions under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(a) (1994) and Utah
Admin. Code Rule R865-19-29S. Vermax of Florida lost ownership of the manufactured
products at the point of delivery across state lines, and its subsequent involvement, if any,
was solely to arrange for the installation of property it did not own. Thus, Vermax of
Florida is no different from the contractor in Thorup who was not liable for sales taxes
on property it installed, but did not own.
The Tax Commission thus has not demonstrated any legal basis for imposing taxes
on Vermax of Florida's purchases of raw materials, the only transactions for which it is
seeking taxes. (Tax Commission Brief, at 9, 14). Applying the nondeferential correction
of error standard that applies to this issue of law, Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(b) (1994),
this Court should reverse the Tax Commission's assessment of additional sales tax.

9

II.

THE TAX COMMISSION IMPROPERLY DENIED VERMAX OF
FLORIDA'S REQUEST FOR ABATEMENT OF THE TEN PERCENT
NEGLIGENCE PENALTY.
A.

Vermax of Florida Is A Separate And Distinct Entity With Different
Owners From The Entity That Was Subject To Prior Audits.

In its brief, the Tax Commission persistently mistakes Vermax of Florida for
Vermax Corporation.

As a result of that misapprehension, the Tax Commission

continues to insist that the 10% negligence penalty was warranted.
The Tax Commission accuses Vermax of Florida of "reinventing itself," yet
ignores the fact that the only evidence in the record demonstrates that Vermax of Florida
is a different entity from the subject of the prior audit. In addition to those facts added
to the Record by stipulation, Mr. Lindsay, a Vermax of Florida employee, testified at the
hearing as follows:
Q:

Okay. Has the Vermax Corporation always been owned by the same

people or entities?
A:

No.

Q:

When, if ever, did that change, if you know?

A:

The latest change is August, 1987.

Q:

And what happened in August of '87?

10

A:

That's when Vermax was purchased from Jerry Hawk and/or

whoever was — they may not have been an individual himself; he and his
family then incorporated into Vermax of Florida.
Q:

Okay. Before the Florida corporation bought it, to your knowledge,

was it a Utah corporation?
A:

To my knowledge, yes.

(Formal Hearing Transcript, Page 16, Lines 9-21). Mr. Lindsay later testified that Jerry
Hawk left Vermax shortly after the 1987 change in ownership. (IcL, Page 40, Lines 1120).
The documents supporting the current audit clearly indicate that the taxpayer is
"Vermax of Florida, Inc., a Florida corporation doing business in Utah," rather than the
Vermax Corporation (a Utah corporation) that was the subject of prior audits. (See, e.g.,
R. 0030, 0043). Once the unique and independent status of Vermax of Florida was
shown at the hearing, the burden shifted to the Tax Commission to establish reasons, e.g.
notice or actual knowledge, why one corporation should be penalized for the negligence
of a corporation from which it merely purchased assets. There is no evidence, and there
was no finding, that Vermax of Florida knew about the Tax Commission's prior
treatments of Vermax Corporation.
The Tax Commission improperly assumes that Mr. Lindsay had knowledge of the
prior audit and then erroneously imputes that knowledge to the corporation.
11

That

reasoning is flawed for several reasons. First, there is no evidence that Mr. Lindsay had
any knowledge of the prior audit. In fact, Mr. Lindsay's job responsibilities did not
include the collection of taxes; instead, he worked in manufacturing, setting up a
contracting division, and sales management. (Formal Hearing Transcript, Page 16, Lines
3-8).

His current position is director of installation.

(IcL, Page 16, Lines 22-23).

Nothing in the record indicates that Mr. Lindsay would have had reason or opportunity
to learn of the prior audit. If he had no such knowledge, there is simply no record
knowledge to impute to Vermax of Florida.
Second, the Tax Commission erroneously asserts that "no changes in personnel are
in evidence." In so arguing, the Tax Commission misunderstands its burden. Once the
separate corporate existence is established, it is not Vermax of Florida's burden to prove
a negative, i.e., no continuity of persons with knowledge.

Rather, it is the Tax

Commission's burden to prove that a Vermax Corporation employee with knowledge of
the prior audit continued in a position of responsibility with Vermax of Florida. See
Johnson v. BelL 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 1983) (imposing on party claiming interest in
property burden of proving actual notice on part of trustee under a deed of trust of
predecessor's interest in land).
Mr. Lindsay testified that Gerry Hawk, the owner of Vermax Corporation, left the
company shortly after the ownership changed. (Formal Transcript Hearing, Page 40,
Lines 11-20). No carryovers in personnel are in evidence, other than Mr. Lindsay, who
12

had no knowledge of the prior audit. There is no evidence, let alone substantial evidence
in the record, to support the Tax Commission's mistaken premise that Vermax
Corporation personnel with knowledge of the prior audits continued to be employed by
Vermax of Florida. Consequently, the conclusion the Tax Commission draws from that
premise is incorrect, and there is no reason why Vermax of Florida should be "deemed"
to have notice of the prior audit of a separate corporate entity.

Nor has the Tax

Commission demonstrated any actual notice or knowledge on the part of Vermax of
Florida.
The Tax Commission has thus failed to put forth any evidence showing that
Vermax of Florida "clearly had knowledge of the rules" at issue here. Vermax of
Florida, on the other hand, has demonstrated (1) a change in ownership as the result of
a purchase of assets in 1987, (2) the departure of the prior owner, Gerry Hawk, from the
employment of Vermax of Florida shortly after the change in ownership, and (3) the
existence of a separate corporate entity, Vermax of Florida, doing business in Utah. On
these facts, no evidence exists to support the Tax Commission's assessment of a
negligence penalty. Even if this Court found some evidence to support the penalty, any
such evidence does not rise to the level of substantial evidence to support the finding.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(a) (1994).

13

B.

Even If This Court Affirms The Assessment Against Vermax of Florida, A
Negligence Penalty Is Inappropriate Under The Prevailing Legal Standard.

Under the prevailing standard, a negligence penalty:
is appropriate when the taxpayer has failed to pay taxes and
a reasonable investigation into the applicable rules and statutes
would have revealed that the taxes were due . . . . [T]he
taxpayer can escape the penalty if he or she can show that he
or she based the nonpayment of taxes on a legitimate, good
faith interpretation of an arguable point of law.
Hales Sand & Gravel v. Audit Div.. 842 P.2d 887, 895 (Utah 1992). As set forth above,
Vermax of Florida was not liable for sales taxes in any event. And, if it is liable, it was
not negligent because it based its nonpayment on a good faith construction of the sales
tax law, which acknowledges that "[wjhether a taxpayer is a real property contractor for
sales tax purposes usually is fact sensitive." Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Tax Comm'n.
839 P.2d 303, 309 (Utah 1992).
If Vermax of Florida is a real property contractor, if it owned the products it was
installing as a real property contractor, and if its interpretation of the relevant rules and
statutes is proven incorrect on appeal, the fact of its error does not require imposition of
a penalty. IdL (construing penalty imposed for intentional disregard of rule1 and noting
that taxpayer's arguments as to liability demonstrated good faith dispute, although position
was ultimately deemed wrong); accord Hales, 842 P.2d at 895 (reversing negligence

l

A penalty assessed due to intentional underpayment implicates the same standard as a negligence penalty.
See Hales Sand &. Gravel v. Audit Div., 842 P. 2d 887, 895 (Utah 1992).
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penalty because of good faith argument based on understandable confusion, despite
ultimately rejecting petitioner's arguments and affirming Tax Commission on the merits).
Thus, this Court should reverse the Tax Commission's imposition of a penalty, even if
this Court ultimately concludes Vermax of Florida's in-state component purchases were
taxable.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Vermax of Florida respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the Commission's assessment of additional sales tax and negligence penalty, and
remand for findings not inconsistent therewith.
DATED this ? ^ d a y of May, 1995.
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Respectfullv^ubmitte/,

Mark O. Morris, Esq.
Amy E. Weissman, Esq.
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.
Attorneys for Vermax of Florida, Inc.
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